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Towards an Auditable Cryptographic Access
Control to High-value Sensitive Data
Krzysztof Kanciak, and Konrad Wrona
Abstract—We discuss the challenge of achieving an auditable
key management for cryptographic access control to high-value
sensitive data. In such settings it is important to be able to audit
the key management process - and in particular to be able to
provide verifiable proofs of key generation. The auditable key
management has several possible use cases in both civilian and
military world. In particular, the new regulations for protection
of sensitive personal data, such as GDPR, introduce strict
requirements for handling of personal data and apply a very
restrictive definition of what can be considered a personal data.
Cryptographic access control for personal data has a potential
to become extremely important for preserving industrial ability
to innovate, while protecting subject’s privacy, especially in the
context of widely deployed modern monitoring, tracking and pro-
filing capabilities, that are used by both governmental institutions
and high-tech companies. However, in general, an encrypted data
is still considered as personal under GDPR and therefore cannot
be, e.g., stored or processed in a public cloud or distributed
ledger. In our work we propose an identity-based cryptographic
framework that ensures confidentiality, availability, integrity of




IT is often claimed that the 21st century is an age of data.The data is one of the most important assets, enabling
information superiority for military operations, protection of
citizens by the governments and continuous improvement in
health care and other public services. Although data mining
and artificial intelligence have been around for several decades,
attracting fluctuating research and commercial interest, it is in
the last decade that the data, and particular the personal data,
became one of the most sought for assets - both in context of
commercial activities and the intelligence gathering.
Despite of all this potential for contributing to greater good,
the data can be also used for malicious purposes - and indeed
the immediate impact of this malicious use on individuals
and society can be even greater than long-term opportunities
promised by so-called data science. Identity theft, manipu-
lation of public opinion, and activity of companies such as
Cambridge Analytica are all good examples how data can be
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misused. Moreover, the high profile leaks by insiders, such as
Bradley Manning and Edward Snowden, and through national-
sponsored hackers, such as the Sandworm group [1], underline
the need for strengthening defence-in-depth measures and
ensuring confidentiality and integrity of data at rest, in transit
and in use. We need to develop a comprehensive approach for
protection of high-value sensitive data that meets both strin-
gent requirements related to defence against sophisticated and
powerful adversaries as well as stringent legal requirements
introduced by the recent privacy regulations. In the rest of
this paper we primarily focus on a civilian use case related
to protection of personal data in context of the European
GDPR regulation, however our discussion is also applicable
to governmental and military applications.
A. Protection of personal data
During the last decade we could observe an increasing
awareness among regulators and non-governmental organi-
zations about importance of protection of privacy - and in-
adequacy of the existing norms and laws in this context.
This has resulted in development of several legally-binding,
as well as voluntary, frameworks focusing on protection of
personal information - the most prominent of them being
the European Union General Data Protection Regulation [2].
The GDPR by design gives individuals better control over
their personal data (any information relating to an identified
or identifiable natural person) and establishes a single data
protection regulation across the EU, covering an easier access
to personal data, a right to rectification, a clearer right to
erasure (right to be forgotten), a new right to data portability,
a right to consent, and a right to be informed about a breach
of one’s personal data. The GDPR generally follows a binary
approach to personal data – the data is either personal or not.
If data is considered to be personal data, the full weight of the
GDPR’s regulatory regime applies to any entity processing that
information. In this context, an encrypted personal data falls
in a kind of a grayscale - although ciphertexts can be mostly
considered as indistinguishable in context of the concerned
subjects, they can still be matched to the concrete subject if
an appropriate key is available.
There is a fundamental contradiction between development
of new business models, that often utilize a wide spectrum
of data sources, and the ability to enforce an effective pro-
tection of personal data. The increased operational burden
and potential liability, introduced by legal frameworks such as
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the GDPR, can discourage and hamper innovation in services
and new business model. With the GDPR, even organizations
without a physical market presence in the EU may still be
required to comply with the GDPR if the organization offers
paid or unpaid goods or services to individuals located in the
EU or if the organization is collecting personal data about
individuals within the EU. In addition, if an organization works
with suppliers or partners that operate in the EU, they will
expect the organization to comply with the GDPR in order to
limit their own risk. The GDPR compliance is considered a
requirement to conduct business with EU data subjects.
It is worth mentioning that year by year (or data theft by
data theft) individuals are becoming increasingly aware of
the threats of data breaches, as well as of commercial value
of their personal data. The GDPR provides a framework for
protecting personal data across the European Union and aims
to give back the control over personal data to individuals. As
a consequence, an adequate balance between personal data
protection and data-based business models has to be achieved.
We think that modern cryptography offers tools that make it
possible.
B. Cryptographic solutions to personal data protection
We believe that cryptography provides a key solution to
protect privacy of individuals while preserving opportunities
for innovation in IT services. In our work we discuss a
set of cryptographic techniques that ensure confidentiality,
availability, integrity of data and at the same time are in our
opinion compliant with data protection framework. Moreover,
thanks to use of cryptography, consumers could in a potentially
much more fine-grained and dynamic way decide with whom,
when and what data they share.
Personal data encryption has a potential to become ex-
tremely important for preserving innovation in business mod-
els in a data-driven economy, while protecting subjects’ pri-
vacy, especially in the context of widely deployed modern
monitoring, tracking and profiling capabilities, used both
by governmental institutions and by high-tech companies.
We support an opinion that for achieving balance between
data protection and not restricting the growth of the digital
economy would be for the European Data Protection Board
(EDPB) to maintain an up-to-date list of proven encryption
technologies. Any personal data that was encrypted with those
technologies vetted by the EDPB would be considered “not
personal” for any parties who did not have the encryption
key. [3]. In such scenario, any personal data that is encrypted
using cryptographic solutions vetted by the EDPB would be
considered not personal. In this article we propose suitable
candidates for such cryptographic solutions and discuss some
of challenges related to their use in practice.
In order to make our discussion more concrete, let us discuss
some examples of business use cases where individuals will-
ingly provide their consent to disclose some of their personal
data. In 1998 auto insurance company Progressive launched
in the United States so called Snapshot program 1, the first
large scale telematic-based tracking program. Progressive used
1https://www.progressive.com/auto/discounts/snapshot/
the program to incentivize good driving habits by offering
discounts to safe drivers. However, in 2013, the company
started using the collected data also to penalize the bad drivers.
Quasi overnight, the application of the collected data has
changed - from awarding to penalizing. And although from a
technical perspective one could argue that this is alike, clearly
from the perspective of the users, it has a completely different
impact.
C. Privacy-preserving storage
Privacy-preserving storage of personal data in a public
repository, such as a public cloud or a distributed ledger,
enables also new channels of communication between or-
ganizations, including financial institutions, and their users
or clients. Various EU regulatory provisions require that a
company must provide certain information to a client in
writing, either on paper or using another durable medium.
Such record-keeping requirements are included, for example,
in the revised Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
(MiFID II). Therefore, durable medium has become one of
the biggest regulatory challenges for the financial institutions
and banks are analyzing various durable medium options
and looking into innovative alternatives. One of frequently
discussed technologies include distributed ledger technology.
However, most of such blockchain-based notary-like solutions
are not compliant with the restrictions placed on personal data
processing by the GDPR.
D. Fine-grained release of information
Many of the current approaches to protecting access to
personal data are largely binary - when a legal agreement with
a service provider is acknowledged by the user, the provider
gains access to all future (and sometimes even some past)
personal data of interest. This approach is questionable, as
the user has to rely on and trust the provider with respect
to technical measures taken to protect his data, as well as to
adhering to an intended use of the data. Of course, there is
a legal framework in place to protect user, but this does not
address the fact that once privacy regarding some data is lost,
e.g. due to a successful cyber attack or commercial misuses,
it cannot be regained.
Cryptographic access control has a potential to offer much
more fine-grained control over release of personal data. In
particular, using approaches such as attributed-based access
control, relatively complex access control policies can be
integrated into the key management process. This, combined
with individual encryption of specific data elements, enable
implementation of fine-grained approach to control and release
of personal data.
Our proposed framework uses a combination of mechanisms
in order to ensure a holistic protection of data. Identity-based
encryption (IBE) is used to preserve confidentiality, whereas
integrity and accountability are protected by a blockchain.
Availability is ensured by a decentralized high-performance
storage system.
As our goal is to make our work understandable to a broad
spectrum of readers with varying background, we provide in
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the following sections a concise introduction to all crypto-
graphic, legal and operational concepts that are required to
understand our framework.
E. Related work
We observe growing number of articles about managing
sensitive data in distributed environments and we share emerg-
ing opinion that simple encryption mechanisms do not cover
all desired by GDPR regulation requirements. This subject is
gaining a lot of attention recently, but we are not aware of any
ready-made approach or system in the world of cryptography
that solves all issues formulated above without any doubts.
In our work we cover various areas, such as the GDPR com-
pliance [4], [5], data protection, cryptography and distributed
ledger technology. However, from a functional perspective
the most related work is in the area of blockchain-based
encryption schemes and privacy-preserving solutions [6]–[12]
such as Identity-Based Puncturable Encryption, decentralized,
fine-grained key management [13]–[15], decryption delegation
rights management [16]–[18], and threshold schemes [19]–
[21]. In our work we focus on permissioned blockchain
solutions like Hyperledger blockchain technologies ecosys-
tem [22]. However, our solution could be also extended to
achieve larger decentralization by using a public ledger -
our inspiration here is from the work performed within the
NuCypher project 2 and Umbral threshold proxy re-encryption
scheme [23], [24]. NuCypher allows data owner delegating
decryption rights to recipient through a re-encryption process
performed by a set of semi-trusted proxies. When threshold
value of proxies perform re-encryption, recipient is able to
combine these independent re-encryptions and decrypt the
original message using his private key.
II. CRYPTOGRAPHY AND LEGAL DATA PROTECTION
REQUIREMENTS
An obvious and potentially effective approach to protecting
personal data is encryption. Data-intensive systems, such as
financial systems or IoT solutions, may collect various data
that can be considered personal, at the same time introducing
a business need to store and process collected big data in
a convenient and cost-effective way. But the question if an
encrypted data should be treated as personal or not gets
convoluted due to the GDPR’s inclusion of two other concepts:
anonymization and pseudonymization.
The GDPR considers anonymized data as data, which has
been irreversibly stripped of any way of identifying the
underlying individual, even by the organization that did the
anonymizing. From crypto perspective it is more like hash-
ing than encryption. Encryption assumes ciphertext-plaintext
mapping existence. Thus encryption is definitely not locking
the data up and throwing away the key.
Pseudonymization, on the other hand, involves the process-
ing of personal data in such a way that the data can no
longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use
of additional information. While it does provide additional
2https://www.nucypher.com/
safeguards, pseudonymized data, unlike anonymized data, is
still unequivocally considered personal data under the GDPR,
as noted in Recital 26. Under that same recital, anonymized
data is no longer personal data because it has been transformed
to unidentifiable. Article 4 of the GDPR states that personal
data is ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable
natural person (‘data subject’).’ Thus, as long as there is a key
to the encrypted data out there somewhere, the personal data
can be traced back to the individual and the GDPR will apply.
Pseudonymized data, however, should be considered identi-
fiable if it could be attributed to an individual. Pseudonymiza-
tion is reversible and entity, which pseudonymized the data,
possesses secret mapping to reverse the process. This is,
from cryptographic point of view, more or less definition of
encryption. In anonymization, no one has a secret key or
the key is gone. In pseudonymization, the same party who
pseudonymizes the data usually does have a key. However,
with encryption, many of the parties who are processing
the data, such as cloud storage providers, do not have the
encryption key to unscramble that data. The encryption key
stays with the generator or the end user of the data. The
fundamental difference is: Who holds the metaphorical key?
A. Role of encryption in enforcement of the GDPR
Encryption is mentioned in the GDPR as one of the mea-
sures that can be taken to maintain security and to prevent
processing in infringement of the regulation, but it is not as
strong category as pseudonymization or anonymization. The
GDPR states that companies need to take into account the
state-of-the-art, risks and severity for the rights and freedoms
of the data subjects when implementing encryption. This en-
cryption should ideally always cover the entire communication
in an end-to-end manner and it is nowadays becoming common
practice.
The simple conclusion is that encrypted data is consid-
ered as personal and cannot be processed, e.g., on a public
blockchain. This differs from an approach commonly taken by
cryptographers and in secure protocol design, where an objec-
tive is to ensure that an encrypted data is, generally speaking,
indistinguishable from a random string of bits and thus may
be transported over public channels. Nevertheless, because of
mostly reversible character of encryption, it is often argued
that encryption is from a legal perspective more conceptually
similar to pseudonymization than anonymization and therefore
encrypted data would also be considered as a personal data
under the GDPR [3]. We think that the question of how
encrypted data would be viewed under the GPDR is still an
open one. We believe it is important to create discussion forum
with participants with legal and cryptographic background in
order to explore this important topic more in-depth.
B. Identity-based encryption for personal data protection
We believe that identity-based encryption (IBE) may offer a
suitable answer to the GDPR personal data protection require-
ments. In identity-based approach publicly known string (e.g
email address of recipient) is needed to encrypt message, but
the instantiation of the decryption key is separated in time until
452 K. KANCIAK, K. WRONA
the moment when recipient makes request to so-called Key
Generation Center (KGC). The complete process is described
in more details in Section IV. But, the most important fact
from the privacy perspective is that the secret key, required for
decryption of the data, does not exist until the recipient asks
for its generation. We think this very specific setting may solve
the problem of possessing keys to pseudonymized data (that
was formulated in paragraph above) and allows considering
IBE encrypted data as not personal. Proposed approach has
several advantages:
• key recovery in IBE setting is fully controlled by KGC
and the key does not exist up to successful authorization
of secret message recipient;
• key recovery process fulfills policy implemented in orga-
nization (including the right to be forgotten);
• organization is able to implement policies that will ensure
proper data processing like private key expiration period
or forgotten user policy;
• message recipient does not need private key before he
receives message (PKI case).
In [25] we can find same considerations: there is an on-
going debate surrounding whether data typically stored on
a distributed ledger, such as public keys and transactional
data qualify as personal data for the purposes of the GDPR.
Specifically, the question is whether personal data that has
been encrypted or hashed still qualifies as personal data. This
document points that the holder of the encryption key can
still re-identify each data subject through decryption given that
the personal data is still present in the dataset that has been
encrypted. As a consequence, encrypted data remains personal
data — at least for the holder of the key able to identify
such data. The Article 29 Working Party 3 indeed clarified
in its opinion on cloud computing that although encryption
’may significantly contribute to the confidentiality of personal
data if implemented correctly’ it does not ’render personal
data irreversibly anonymous’ (Directive 95/46/EC. Recital 26).
In [26] it was suggested that ’sufficiently well-encrypted data,
where the provider has no access to the key, should not be
’personal data’, and similarly with sufficiently anonymised
data’. This implies that there is a fundamental distinction from
a legal perspective between scenarios, where parties may have
access to the decryption key and the scenarios where it could
be ensured that such access does not exist.
IBE allows decryption key creation to be postponed to
the decryption moment. Until the key is created the risk of
linking the data to the owner is reduced - and would require
successful attack on a used cryptographic mechanism or its
implementation. In our work we consider blockchain-based
IBE decryption key creation that meets the requirement of
auditability.
III. AUDITABLE KEY AND DATA MANAGEMENT
As discussed earlier, a critical assumption in our approach is
non-existence of the decryption key before generation of such
key is requested by an authorized user. However, the meaning
3https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/news.cfm
of non-existence requires some more discussion. In particular,
in a naive implementation of an IBE, the key generation
authority has to be treated as a trusted-third party, as it can
generate, without user’s knowledge, private keys related to
his identity. A same naive implementation could include an
identifier of a recipient of an encrypted document in a metadata
attached to the encrypted object. In such a scenario, it would
be easy for a compromised - or misbehaving - key generation
authority to generate the decryption and to decrypt any chosen
object encrypted under the scheme. Moreover, such a scenario
does not provide a strong and auditable privacy protection. In
this case, although the decryption key might not exist in the
theory at the moment when data is encrypted, in practice it
can be easily generated on-demand by an authority without a
control or knowledge of a user - this can result effectively in a
Big Brother scenario that, although most probably welcomed
by many governments and organizations, is unacceptable from
a citizen’s perspective.
In order to prevent such a systematic failure, the imple-
mented IBE scheme needs to meet specific requirements that
are discussed in the following sections.
A. Anonymization of encrypted objects
The encrypted objects cannot provide any clues that would
enable disclosure of the identity required for decryption. The
idea of fully anonymous IBE ciphertexts was explored, e.g.,
in [27] and [28]. The committed blind anonymous IBE scheme
has been proposed in [29] and has an advantage of fulfilling
both our requirement for anonymity of the ciphertext and
escrow protection, as discussed in the next section.
B. Preventing unilateral generation of decryption keys
In order to ensure an auditable cryptographic access control,
we would like to prevent any entity from unilateral generation
of the decryption keys. This simple to formulate requirement
is rather difficult to achieve in practice. For example, in IBE
the ability to generate the decryption key is removed from the
end user, and assigned to the key generation center (KGC)
instead. Unfortunately, in simple IBE schemes KGC needs to
be a trusted party, as it is able to generate any decryption
used in the system.There are two main approaches that can
be implemented in order to reduce and control the inherent
key escrow characteristics of the IBE schemes. They both rely
on splitting of some aspects of the key generation authority
between multiple entities:
1) Separation of the identity authentication and key gener-
ation actions between two or more parties [30],
2) Dividing of the secret key required for generation of the
private decryption key between multiple entities [31],
[32].
In both cases the ability of key escrow and uncontrolled de-
cryption and access to private data is significantly reduced, as
performing such illegitimate activity would require collusion
of several independent parties.
Separation of authentication and key issuing tasks between
two parties - an identity certifying authority and a key generat-
ing authority has been proposed in [30]. In this approach, iden-
tity certifying identity issues a certificate, that can be verified
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by the key generation authority. In order to achieve increased
privacy, it is assumed that the identity certifying authority does
neither log identity of the user requesting certification nor the
issued certificate - or any other information that could be used
to connect these two.
Another method of avoiding key escrow relies on splitting
the master secret key between multiple parties, by relaying on
threshold schemes. This approach was first suggested in [31],
where implementation using verifiable secret sharing [33] was
proposed. The concept was further extended in [32].
Recently, an approach called registration-based encryption
(RBE) [34] has been proposed in order to solve the key
escrow problem in the IBE. The solution relies on replacing
private key generator with a public key accumulator. This
work has been further extended in [35], where first efficient
implementation of RBE has been proposed, and in [36], where
a verifiable RBE, providing succinct proofs of registration and
non-registration, has been proposed.
Trusted third party don’t have to be given the ability to
decrypt ciphertexts intended for users in so called certificate-
less encryption schemes [37], [38]. It’s a form of asymmetric
encryption that eliminates the disadvantages of traditional
PKI based public-key encryption scheme, i.e. doesn’t require
digital certificates or a public-key infrastructure, and identity-
based encryption i.e. it remains secure against any third party
attacks including KGC. These schemes use two pairs of keys.
One of them is a classic private-public key pair but the public
key is not signed by any kind of Certificate Authority. Second
pair of keys is ID-based and consists identity as a public
component and and the associated identity-based private key
supplied by a key generation centre beforehand. To encrypt
the message use of both public components is needed (identity
and classic public key. Decryption requires both secret values
- classic private key generated by the party of communication
and the id-based private key supplied by the key generation
centre. This setting implies the key generation centre cannot
break the confidentiality of a transmitted message as it does
not know the classic private key of any party. The problem is
that classic public keys still have to be somehow publicised
and identity cannot be easily changed (KGC is still needed
to generate private keyassociated with identity) which means
granularity and expressiveness of this approach is very limited.
C. Unique decryption key for each object
In order to enable a fine-grained cryptographic access
control and a selective release of sensitive data, it is important
to ensure that each data object is encrypted with a separate
key.
D. Durable log of key generation requests
It is important to verify, for which data objects a decryption
key has been generated - and thus which objects require
different handling and protection. Every operation (addition,
removal, key instantiation) is logged on blockchain. Decrypted
objects in our PoC are deleted or re-encrypted with ’new
identity’ which translates into a changed period of validity
(explained in Section IV-B).
IV. IDENTITY-BASED ENCRYPTION
The IBE is not a new idea - it has almost 20 years of
research history and it is an established encryption method.
For example, the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme, which uses
techniques from pairing-based cryptography, is described in
RFC 5091, published in 2007 []. The concept of identity-
based cryptography has been introduced in [39]. Its primary
innovation was the use of user identity attributes, such as email
addresses or phone numbers, instead of digital certificates, for
encryption and signature verification. The original motivation
for IBE was to simplify certificate management in email
systems. This feature significantly reduces the complexity of
a cryptography system by eliminating the need for generating
and managing users’ certificates. It also makes it much easier
to encrypt messages to non-enrolled users, since messages may
be encrypted for users before they interact with any system
components.
Identity-based cryptosystems do not instantiate secret keys
before first encrypted message. Main advantage of IBE is
that it allows a user to encrypt a message without a need
for pre-distribution of encryption keys. An IBE is a public
key scheme, where the public key is derived directly from
the user identity, while a trusted third party, called the Key
Generation Center (KGC), generates the corresponding private
key. It means that there is a way for a sender to encrypt
secret message to a receiver without establishing symmetric
secret key or having public key of receiver. The sender needs
only identity of receiver to encrypt his message. Decryption
key is being instantiated at a distant time when receiver is
authenticated by the KGC. This means in turn that before the
user makes request to KGC for his decryption key, the key
does not exist - and therefore one can argue that encrypted
data is not pseudonymized but anonymized.
A fully functional IBE scheme has been proposed in [31].
The scheme is characterized by a chosen-ciphertext security
in the random oracle model, assuming a variant of the com-
putational Diffie-Hellman problem [40].
When Alice sends an email to Bob, she can simply encrypt
the message using the public key string. There is no need
for Alice to obtain Bob’s public key certificate. When Bob
receives the encrypted email he contacts a third party, the PKG.
Bob authenticates himself to the PKG and obtains his private
key from the PKG. Bob can then read his email.
A. Mathematical background
There are two main methods for implementing IBE
schemes. Bilinear parings on ellipitc curves groups and lat-
tices. Bilinear pairings based schemes have much shorter
keys and ciphertexts and these are important in context
of distributed computing and communication with public
or permissioned distributed ledgers. But these schemes are
susceptible to quantum attacks due to Shor’s algorithm. On
the other hand lattice based IBEs such like Gentry-Peikert-
Vaikuntanathan [41] and Agraval-Boneh-Boyen [42] and their
extensions have quantum algorithm resistance i.e. there are no
quantum algorithms for solving hard computational problems
for lattices.
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Below we describe an IBE scheme using pairings on elliptic
curves. Pairings map pairs of points on an elliptic curve
into the multiplicative group of a finite field. First identity-
based encryption scheme was published in 2001 by Boneh
and Franklin’s [31]. A comprehensive report on pairing-based
cryptography has been published by NIST in 2015 [43].
A point on the elliptic curve E is an ordered pair (x, y),
where x, y ∈ Fq is satisfying equation y2 = x3 + ax + b
(so called the short Weierstrass equation) where a and b are
chosen so that 4a3+27b2 6= 0. Points on elliptic curve form a
finite Abelian group structure. It means there is a way to ”add”
two points on an elliptic curve, and always get another point.
To get possibility of ”points multiplication” we can add them
repeatedly and the discrete logarithm problem in such groups
is believed to be hard, making it ideal for cryptography.
A pairing is a function e that takes a pair of two points on
an elliptic curve and outputs an element in a finite field. The
pairings we consider are bilinear which means that the pairing
map preserves the additive structure of the elliptic curve, and
carries it over into the finite field. We can say a pairing (or
map) e : G1 ×G1 → GT is bilinear if:
• G1 and GT are groups of the same order q
• For all elements a, b ∈ Z∗q , g ∈ G1 e(ga, gb) =
e(g, g)ab
• The map is non-degenerate (i.e., if G1 = 〈g〉, then GT =
〈e(g, g)〉)
• e is efficiently computable.
Now let (G1, GT ) be a pair of bilinear groups where g is
random generator of G1 and there is efficintly computable
pairing e : G1 × G1 → GT . The Decisional Bilinear
Diffie Hellman problem is to decide, given a tuple of values
(g, ga, gb, gc, T ),where a, b, c are selected randomly from Z∗q ,
whether T = e(g, g)abc or if T is random element of GT . So
that the difference of probabilities described in figure below
is negligible: |Pr(Exp(0) = 1)− Pr(Exp(1) = 1)| ≤ ε
Fig. 1. Decisional Bilinear Diffie Hellman
Although in theory pairings exist for any elliptic curve,
in practice there are curves whose pairings are not suitable
for cryptographic applications. There is a specific parameter
of each elliptic curve that can be calculated known as the
embedding degree k. In order to efficiently implement pairings
for use in cryptography, we need k to be small (less than
100). However, k is usually about the same size as q, which
is at least 160 bits — way too big. But there are two
common ways to find pairing-friendly elliptic curves. The first
is to use what are known as supersingular elliptic curves,
which always have k ≤ 6. The second way is to use a
technique called the complex multiplication (CM) method to
construct certain families of elliptic curves with small k. In
brief, the security of identity-based encryption is based on
the property that the particular bilinear maps chosen are one-
way functions, since the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem is
reducible (algorithmically equivalent) to the discrete-log or
inverse operation for these bilinear maps [44].
In order to actually implement any pairing-based crypto-
graphic protocol, it is necessary to choose a specific pairing
function e. The two most commonly used pairings are the
Weil and Tate pairings. With the goal of speeding up computa-
tion, researchers have discovered several new pairings. These
include the Ate, Eta, reduced Tate, twisted Ate, and R-Ate
pairings among others. For further details go to [43] survey
paper that reviews all details. It is ok to treat pairings as a
”black box” and build various cryptographic schemes making
use of assumed properties of the pairings.
B. Definition of identity
As pointed in [31] identity tag may have an arbitrary
form. This means, that it can be used to encode an auxiliary
information. For example, a traditional PKI certificate includes
a preset expiration date. In an IBE system key expiration
can be implemented by including the minimum validity date
in the identity. An illustration of this approach is having
message encrypted by sender using the example identity:
“jonh@company.com —— 2020”, so that John - the receiver
can use his private key during 2020 only and next year John
needs to obtain a new private key from the KGC. Hence, we
get the effect of annual private key expiration. But, unlike in
the case of traditional PKI systems, sender of a message does
not need to obtain a new certificate from John every time John
refreshes his private key - he can just include the new validity
date in the identity. Granularity and expressiveness of this
approach to formulation of the IBE public keys is practically
unlimited.
However, this approach relies on an assumption that the
KGC is able to correctly interpret the syntax and semantics of
a public key and would issue a private decryption key only if
all conditions included in the public key are met.
As a practical example, in our proof-of-concept RFC 5091
IBE implementation, the identity is a JSON document with
predefined parameters.
C. Advantages and disadvantages of the key escrow
The inherent key escrow feature, provided by basic IBE
schemes, opens some specific implementation possibilities. For
example, the decryption process can take place on a third
party server – and while this looks like a huge disadvantage
in crypto world, it could significantly improve usability and
reliability for commercial applications by not requiring any
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client-side installation and client-side keys storage and man-
agement. This is important in some scenarios, e.g., for bank
customers where private key loss could result in their personal
bankruptcy - although these consequences are obvious fact in
cryptocurrencies world, it is difficult to imagine that a regular
bank customer would accept a similar risk. Moreover, finan-
cial, public government institutions require policies specified,
procedures, acts of law and their interpretations, sensitivity
levels, targets of evaluation, information processing standards,
risk management etc. Thus server-side decryption, although
not explicitly compliant with the GDPR, can support many
practical and regulatory requirements.
D. Basic IBE flow
A basic IBE flow involves the following parties: the sender
S, the recipient R and key generation center KGC that
can extract private keys from public keys. In our proof-of-
concept there are three more ancillary parties: distributed stor-
age (reponsible for availability), distributed ledger (integrity,
auditability) and authorization provider which is pluggable
component responsible for handling authentication, ensuring
that users are actually identified in a required way (like phone
authorization number, email verification link, but also national
ID with ability of signing documents or future blockchain
based identity providers). Prior to generation of the private
key, it is also critical to perform an appropriate authentication
of the requester, however the details of such authentication
process are outside of the IBE schemes.
A standard IBE scheme consists of four algorithms:
• Setup: Prior to the actual communication, a one-time
setup must be performed in order to initialize the system.
This process generates the public parameters that must be
distributed among all parties, and the master secret which
should only be deployed to the Key Generation Center.
The master secret allows the KGC to extract private keys.
Technically setup takes a security parameter n and
returns chosen elliptic curve, chosen hash function with
consistent with n output size and a product of secret s and
a random point P on the curve. The system parameters
include a description of a finite message space M , and a
description of a finite ciphertext space C
• Encrypt: The sender uses its identifier to encrypt the
plaintext message. Afterwards, the ciphertext is trans-
mitted to the recipient. Encrypt phase takes as input
parameters, ID, and m ∈ M . It returns a ciphertext
c ∈ C
• Extract: When the recipient receives the ciphertext, it
queries the KGC for its private key with their public
key. Given the identity of the recipient is confirmed,
the private key is extracted and sent back. This phase
takes as input parameters, master-key, and an arbitrary
ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, and returns a private key d. Here ID is
an arbitrary string that will be used as a public key and d
is the corresponding private decryption key. The Extract
algorithm extracts a private key from the given public
key.
• Decrypt: Possessing the private key pair of the public
key, the recipient attempts to decrypt the received cipher-
text. If the private key matches the public key that was
used during encryption, the process succeeds, resulting in
the plaintext. Decrypt phase takes as input parameters,
c ∈ C, and a private key d. Then returns m ∈M .
The greatest advantage of IBE lies in the fact that neither the
sender, nor the recipient needs to obtain each other’s public
keys in advance. When performing the encryption, they simply
use publicly-known information.
E. Proxy re-encryption (PRE)
Identity-based proxy re-encryption allows a proxy to trans-
form ciphertext from one public key to another, without learn-
ing anything about the underlying plaintext. A data producer
encrypts a message m, with Alice’s public key pkA, resulting
in ciphertext cA = encrypt(pkA,m) — it’s so called first-
level ciphertext. Alice decides to delegate access to message
m to Bob, who has the key pair (pkB , skB). To do so, Alice
creates a re-encryption key: rkA→B = rekey(skA, pkB).
In re-encryption phase second-level ciphertexts is created
cB = reencrypt(cA, rkA→B). In identity-based approach
instantiation of the decryption key is separated in time until
the moment when recipient makes request to KGC and from
the GDPR perspective the secret key does not exist until
the recipient asks for its generation. In identity-based proxy
re-encryption scheme with fully controlled KGC we can go
step further and ensure decryption keys instantiation only for
re-encrypted ciphertext. It means that first-level ciphertexts
(ciphertexts before re-encryption) will never be decrypted i.e
can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject. So as IBE
may offer decryption key postponement, PRE in very specific
setting postpones ciphertext creation. From GDPR point of
view first-level ciphertext
V. USE CASES
Below, we discuss two possible use cases for use of IBE-
based auditable cryptographic access control for data manage-
ment. They are focused on providing a legal compliance with
privacy and banking regulations, while supporting business
innovation and user’s ability to control the data.
A. Durable medium
We have chosen to develop proof of concept that fulfills
idea of durable medium. It is an important mechanism that
banks are required to use in order to keep their customers
informed about products, agreements, payment schedules, etc.
In practice, the implementation of a durable medium is not
straight forward. The EU Court of Justice has challenged
the practice of sending messages to customers using banking
mailboxes because such approach does not guarantee the
immutability of the distributed documents. Thus, a durable
medium has become one of the biggest regulatory challenges
faced by the financial institutions. In particular, a durable
medium needs to:
• allow information to be addressed personally to the
recipient
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• enable storage of information that is accessible for future
reference and for a period of time adequate for the
purposes of the information (storability)
• allow the unchanged reproduction of the information
stored (reproduction)
Our threat model assumes that the adversary is computa-
tionally bounded, secure cryptographic hash functions exist,
and there is a bilinear pairing in which the decisional bilinear
Diffie-Hellman assumption holds. We need also blockchain
BFT consensus assumptions. We assume that message recipi-
ents do not trust senders.
1) Blockchain-based document life-cycle management: Our
proposed storage system is implemented in public cloud (we
use major commercial service providers, i.e., Azure and AWS)
and is based on Gaia4. Access control in a storage system is
performed on a per-address basis. Every document committed
to the storage system has its metadata blockchain transaction.
Metadata contains hash of the document, its language, validity
time, pointer to a transaction committing an earlier version
of the document, publisher’s and signer’s identity, domain
name, operation type (creation, update, erasure, reading) —
all parameters to provide full document life-cycle management
and none of them de-anonymizes the document recipient.
2) Key generation component: We investigated three vari-
ants of possible solution. First one is a centralized KGC (with
a trusted third party) and is the closest one to the solutions cur-
rently implemented in the payment system infrastructure. Sec-
ond variant adds a very simple threshold scheme to improve
customers privacy and weaken identity management system
reliance. Third one is the most complex one and implements
federated multi-authority identity management system.
a) Centralized KGC: Every encrypted document can be
downloaded by recipient. The private key for this particular
document is instantiated at the time of authentication by KGC.
KGC does not know the location of an encrypted file as it
depends on blockchain transaction hash value so that it cannot
bind the ciphertext to identity. The scheme is simple, but
introduces challenges in terms of reliability and fairness due
to single points of failure or compromise respectively.
b) Threshold scheme: Our threshold scheme is a hybrid
approach using identity-based and symmetric encryption, in-
spired by [45]. Document is encrypted using a symmetric
key that is divided between separate security domains (i.e.
KGCs) that act as two separate authentication components.
The recipient has to authenticate to KGCs, possibly using
different methods of authentication, in order to collect parts
of symmetric key required to decrypt the document. In
this approach KGC fraud impersonation (with file location
knowledge) becomes infeasible. But it has to be noted that
intermediate symmetric encryption breaks assumption of key
non-existence, which was critical in our approach in order to
provide the GDPR compliance. It means that right after secret
key is divided and encrypted with identity of the recipient, it
has to be implicitly forgotten.
c) Federated multi-authority identity managers: Last
tested approach is inspired by [46]. It is most secure, but
4https://github.com/blockstack/gaia
the least applicable due to its complexity and low suitabil-
ity to the business environment of the discussed case. This
approach is inspired by [46] and assumes identity propagation
between different but federated security domains which ex-
change messages containing users’ authentication credentials.
All federated parties need to have common interest which is
not obvious in context of own customers data sharing. In
this scheme, multiple established authorities can instantiate
private keys associated with the identities under their control
(i.e. in their security domains) independently. This scheme
has additional authority setup phase that takes as inputs an
identifier of an authentication provider (federated authority)
and the global parameters and outputs a public key and a
master secret key for a given authority. In the federated identity
management schema, authorization providers from different
security domains exchange messages containing authentica-
tion information and credentials characterizing users [47].
This approach can leverage existing conventional centralized
authorities such as corporate directory services, certificate
authorities, or domain name registries. Each separated security
domain serve as its own root of trust. Multi-authority identity
management is an additional layer of identity management and
is implementable in case of common interest or business case
among federation members.
B. Electronic receipt
Second considered use case are digital receipts understood
as machine-readable, electronic substitutes for their contem-
porary paper-based printed counterparts. While in Poland
retail landscape is still not yet adopting digital receipts, other
countries like Sweden or the United Kingdom indicate that the
adoption of digital receipts is actually happening.
A practical problem is to provide functionality of digital
receipts without over-complicating user’s buying experience
and without infringing user’s data ownership. Currently, two
main approaches are used in implemented solutions. First
approach requires users to provide additional data, such as
email or loyalty card, during payment process, which is in
our opinion unnecessary complication of the buying process.
Second approach (used by, e.g., Flux in the UK) passes receipt
data to banking application, which violates user’s right to
privacy, as there is no need for a bank or a card provider
to know user’s shopping list as opposed to only the value
of the payment. There is no need to share this valuable, and
potentially sensitive, information with a bank.
Our proof of concept uses credit card number used during
payment process, which is concatenated with some additional
data to provide an identity utilized in an IBE encryption
process5. Since, under specific circumstances described earlier
in our paper, IBE encrypted data can be considered not
5In details it means consumers allowance for using PSD2 procedure to get
his bank identificators (bank account number, credit cards numbers etc). PSD2
is an EU Directive 2007/64/EC, administered by the European Commission
to regulate payment services and payment service providers throughout the
European Union and European Economic Area. The Directive’s purpose is to
increase pan-European competition and participation in the payments industry
also from non-banks, and to provide for a level playing field by harmonizing
consumer protection and the rights and obligations for payment providers and
users.
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personal, the digital receipts can be stored until the moment
of end consumer authentication in his IBE domain. Consumer
releases his personal data for processing at the moment when
a private key is instantiated. Until then, no private keys
exist, which is auditable thanks to a blockchain-based key
management (described in previous paragraph).
In our proposed solution shopping data remains entirely
under consumers control – this also enables potential emer-
gence of a new data market for shopping data. Banks are
used as a authentication providers only which is possible under
PSD2 (Payment Services Directive EU 2015/2366) regulation.
Although our solution requires an update to firmware used in
payment terminals, it does not change payment process from
the customer’s point of view.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented results of our initial investigation of use
of IBE for implementing auditable and the GDPR-compliant
data-management framework that provides decentralized stor-
age and life-cycle management of personal data. Data storage,
access, erasure, and auditability are ensured by a public
blockchain log.
We have proposed three variants of a decentralized frame-
work for auditable management of personal data while main-
taining fairness and confidentiality. We demonstrated the fea-
sibility of using the framework to address the data sharing
needs of actual financial or public organizations in the context
of a durable medium. To address all identified requirements
introduced by the EU regulation framework, we propose a
cryptographic framework using an IBE in combination with
decentralized reliable storage, blockchain-based auditability
and threshold secret sharing. We believe that such a frame-
work can offer a suitable technology to protect the integrity
and confidentiality of shared data and to ensure data-access
accountability by generating a third-party verifiable audit trail
for data accesses. The presented results are in our opinion
promising, but initial and require further validation - both
in context of technical scalability and performance as well
as legal implications. We would like to encourage discussion
within the cryptographic R&D community on how the recent
advances could be used in order to address some practical
issues introduced by increasingly complex regulations and
supervision requirements.
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